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THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF AN ARTWORK 
Abstract: (The Ontological Status of an Artwork) This contribution 
deals with traditional problem of Aesthetics - relation between mate-
rial and ideal components of an artwork. Jan Mukarovsky's view on 
this question is put into wider theoretical context by its comparison 
with the view of Roman Ingarden and John Dewey. 
The aim of the paper is to outline the typology of those different 
approaches and to interfere their theoretical consequences - limits and 
possibilities - for analyses of the art. 
Theoretical projects of thinking about the two main existential 
forms of an artwork teem with terminological configurations, which 
are indicative of differing philosophical assumptions and implicative 
of the diverging space for the theoretical-practical consequences. At 
stake within this problematic field is essentially the relationship, ob-
taining between the material and ideal component of an artwork, or 
the relationship between its material and intellectual (intentional) 
form. 
In this paper, I will address the solution of the quoted relationship 
within Jan Mukarovsky' s aesthetic conception and then, by parallel-
ing his approach with Roman Ingarden's and John Dewey's, I will try 
to locate Mukarovsky's aesthetics into a broader theoretical context. 
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A brief summary of the authors' key ideas as to the given topic seems 
an indispensable point of departure for the declared comparative in-
tentions of the ensuing considerations. 
R. Ingarden discriminates between a material (substantive or physi-
cal) „substructure" of an artwork and a work of art qua intentional 
object. Within his conception, it implies that the artwork's „existential 
foundation lies, above all, within conscious acts, and the qualities, 
determining the artwork, are not, strictly speaking, immanent in it but 
are ascribed, or attributed, to it; or, if you prefer, they are granted to it 
through the conscious acts"1. Thereby, Ingarden has „bracketed" from 
the notion of an artwork its substantive form as such that, albeit need-
ful for the artwork's fixation, does not properly belong in its notion. In 
terms of intentionality, Ingarden in principle distinguishes two forms 
of the intentional object. The one, mostly schematic and multilayered, 
for which he will reserve the notion of an artwork, is an intersubjec-
tive intentional object, the other, in turn, is a monosubjective inten-
tional object, which we obtain by the concretization of entirely indefi-
nite or not entirely definite (schematic) spots in the artwork and which 
Ingarden has named as an aesthetic object. The latter is constituted in 
the process of aesthetic perception (outliving), hence for an aesthetic 
mode of consciousness it is a given, depending on the subject's aes-
thetic attitude, while the artwork is constituted in the process of 
knowledge, hence it presents a given for a knowing mode of con-
sciousness, depending on the subject's theoretical attitude. For Ingar-
den, as theoretical subjects we all of us are equipped with the equal 
„outfit" of consciousness, which would render the result of the process 
of knowledge intersubjective, i.e., identical throughout all the know-
ing subjects. In the case of the aesthetic outliving, the process of con-
cretization is impregnated by the subject's individual emotional life 
experience, which differs from subject to subject, rendering the aes-
thetic object monosubjective and unique for any outliving (perceiving 
subject). 
J. Mukarovsky does make use of the modified „Ingardenian" ter-
minology of an artwork and an aesthetic object, but he will differenti-
ate it, proceeding from other scheme. The point at issue is his differ-
entiation is moved onto the level of the relationship, obtaining be-
tween the material and the ideational: the „matter" of the artwork pre-
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sents the foundation for the whole array of aesthetic objects within our 
consciousness. Similarly to Ingarden, Mukarovsky also sees the con-
sciousness as innately structured, though, again, along different lines. 
Within the abstract of consciousness, he would not differentiate be-
tween the knowing and the aesthetic modes, but he would draw a dis-
tinction between the collective and the individual consciousness, 
while it is just the collective consciousness (as a vehicle of a certain 
set of valid artistic norms of the day) that is the carrier of the „aes-
thetic object" (the latter, under Mukarovsky's interpretation, consti-
tutes the meaning of the artwork-thing). On the level of consciousness, 
Mukarovsky, too, discriminates between „what is common among the 
subjective states of consciousness, generated by the artwork-thing in 
the members of a certain collectivity"2, and what is individual. At that, 
however, he will not dichotomize this relationship in terms of dual 
attitudes (the universal = knowledge, the individual = aesthetic out-
living) but construe it as the interface of collective and individual con-
sciousness. Mukarovsky seems to proceed from the assumption of, as 
it were, the ontological priority of collective consciousness as a cer-
tain core meaning, providing for the associational or connotational 
mechanisms operational within individual consciousness. He assumes 
an aesthetic object to emerge within the individual consciousness just 
by means of projecting the »material« artwork onto the backdrop of 
the current state of art's structure" . 
For all the incompleteness and schematism, which plague this re-
construction of R. Ingarden's and J. Mukarovsky's treatment of the 
ontological status of an artwork, I do feel justified to suggest that 
while resorting to very much the same terminology, the two have 
come to their conclusions, propelled by divergent assumptions. While 
Ingarden will unequivocally place the work of art within the area of 
intentionality and discriminate between its two „dissimilar" forms 
(constituted by different attitudes), Mukarovsky's solution, in my 
opinion, will offer a more viable theoretical framework for the treat-
ment of art concerns, by virtue of incorporating into the notion of an 
artwork the latter's material ingredient. Ingarden's project would re-
duce the material layer to a mere means of an artwork's fixation, 
which implies the pre-existence of the ready-made intentional object 
in the creator's consciousness. From the beholder's perspective, the 
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material layer is then reduced to no more than a stimulus, whose 
function amounts to the „triggering" of the process of an aesthetic 
outliving, which - after the stage of the „introductory emotion" (tak-
ing an aesthetic attitude) - may become detached from the „thing" to 
proceed on its own: the matter is Ingarden does not think it necessary 
for the constructed aesthetic object to correspond with the work of art. 
Even more to it. The incorporation of the collective „aesthetic" con-
sciousness into the ontological structure of the artwork will open up 
much more theoretical opportunities for the application of the histori-
cally dynamic „life" of the artwork than Ingarden's project could do. 
Besides, the semiotic sign-meaning-signified model Mukarovsky used 
for the definition of the artwork will help us reveal further differen-
tials in the conceptions of the two authors. 
Mukarovsky writes we have (as long as we are anxious to study 
objectively such phenomenon as art is) to „view an artwork as a sign 
composed of a sensual symbol, created by the artist; of a ,,meaning"(= 
aesthetic object), lodged within collective consciousness; and of the 
relation to the signified thing, or the relationship towards the total 
context of the social phenomena"4. Ingarden, on the other hand, does 
essentially construe the aesthetic object as a visual representation in 
the individual recipient's consciousness (all of a sudden, the objects' 
image in the „as i f ' modality), which, in the ideal-type case, would 
coincide with that of the creator (the idea of congeniality). So, as has 
been shown, Mukarovsky grasps the aesthetic object as a meaning 
structure within collective consciousness, subject to modification and 
development. Moreover, the ontological independence of the real ob-
ject, intentional one, and the idea in Ingarden's philosophical thought 
permitted him to rule out from his investigations the relationship ob-
taining between the artwork and the reality, or otherwise, the relation-
ship has been reduced to the one sustaining between the real object 
and its „as i f ' existence within the intentional object. Mukarovsky's 
definition, in contrast, perceives the relationship between the artwork 
and „the whole of reality" as constitutive agency of the work of art. 
Without further broader explications, which might transgress the 
bounds of this paper, I would like to voice the view that Mu-
karovsky' s theoretical concept enables the construal of the key ingre-
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dients constitutive of an artwork and a viable discussion about their 
dynamic interface. 
Now J. Dewey in his aesthetic conception will attack the question 
of the relationship between the material and the ideational component 
of an artwork by means of the notion of an artwork-creation he main-
tains to be the result of the artist's concrete practical activities and that 
of an artwork he construes as the consequence of the beholder's per-
ception (rooted in a given artistic creation). That differentiation, how-
ever, bears no character of an outer relation in Dewey's conception, 
since the latter postulates any activity as the wedding of the practical 
and perceptive facets. Activity in Dewey's conception is subsumed 
under the notion of experience, and the latter (the key notion in 
Dewey's philosophy) would emerge, Dewey maintains, as the conse-
quence of the interface between an organism and its environment 
(both natural and social). Under certain circumstances, according to 
Dewey, experience can assume a character of an aesthetic experience, 
or artistic-aesthetic experience. Such experience, yielding art in the 
narrow sense of the word (the broader sense, for Dewey, will embrace, 
e.g., also science, politics and the like), would occur, he believes, in 
two guises: that of activities (rational, concrete-practical), where the 
above quoted human capacities are present in the mode of mutual cor-
rection of „the hand and the eye", and that of perception as the em-
bodiment of that unity, that is to say, while perceiving an object, we as 
if again restore that unity in our „mind's eye". For the pinning down 
of these two guises of the artistic-aesthetic experience and its results, 
viz., artworks-creations and aesthetic works of art, Dewey employs 
other than the sign-meaning couple of notions ( Mukarovsky), namely 
that of expression and meaning. At first sight, the content of the notion 
of an expression in Dewey displays similarities with Mukarovsky's 
notion of a sign - for Dewey, an expression is the conjunction of a 
sensual-perceptual side (an outer one) and the meaning contained in it 
(an inner side). Yet, again, it should be kept in mind that the back-
ground against which the discussed couple of Dewey's notions is seen 
differs from Mukarovsky's. The point at issue is, by an expression 
Dewey does mean, above all, the phenomenon of expressing and ex-
pressiveness as such, and the objective of his theoretical endeavour 
departs from that of Mukarovsky's. Dewey does not seek to investi-
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gate the already constituted world of artistic signs-expressions, but he 
does want to find out what makes any human activity into an expres-
sive act. He will arrive at the conclusion that a human would acquire a 
capacity of performing an act of expression to the extent he or she can 
understand its meaning. Understanding a meaning, for Dewey, implies 
the awareness of the consequences of one's behaviour. The expression 
in art, then, would occur, according to him, where a certain material 
has been used as means of expression, while meeting these require-
ments: the material should express an objective feeling, it has been 
used as such by the artist deliberately, that it constitutes a component 
of the structure of expressions (context) and of the artwork's chrono-
type. The understanding of the meaning of a given work of art is, for 
Dewey, conditioned by the antecedent human experience, or the un-
derstanding does occur on the crossroads of the past human experi-
ence, the underway present, and the future prospects. „The major por-
tion of the past is made up by the tradition"*, writes Dewey, but, at the 
same time, he is quick to remind that the „knowledge" of the tradition 
is by no means sufficient for understanding an artwork: the knowing 
should „grow out of a particular, intimate commerce with the objects 
composing that tradition"6. In one voiced with Mukarovsky, Dewey 
insists that, from the beholder's perspective, the work of art would 
stand out as a total unity of the sensual properties and meaning (their 
severance being an auxiliary and methodological act). But dissimilar 
to Mukafovsky, who will assign to theory the function to analyze su-
praindividual structures (in this, Mukafovsky proceeds from the belief 
that „it is not an individual artwork that constitutes the essence of art; 
it is a set of artistic skills and norms that is, or the artistic structure 
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considered suprapersonal and social , Dewey would insist that art is 
primarily a quality of activity and characterizes human experience, 
which is always individual, integrative, practically lived, and immedi-
ately outlived. That all makes experience essential. As to theory, it 
does constitute but one ingredient of that integrative human experi-
ence, being no more than an assistant, whose task lies in „helping the 
ultimate effect of the perceptual experience, where the differences 
(between the sensual and rational) have been overcome and the initial 
conception has been transformed into an indispensable meaning of the 
material mediated through senses"8. 
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After that brief survey, I would like to advance a few inferences 
concerning the relationship between art and human beingness, as they 
have flown from the above comparative examination of the three indi-
vidual approaches. 
Ingarden relegates an artwork to the intentional space, that has very 
little to do with the human life, that moves on the level of real objects. 
As he would write himself, „these activities (processes of an aesthetic 
enjoyment, my addition - Z.K.) cause no wrinkle in the real world, 
surrounding us, that is why, in this respect, they are not taken into 
account"9. In order to get into the intentional aesthetic space, we have 
to perform an act, similar to the phenomenological epoché. Then the 
aesthetic relation will turn out to be „but something secondary and 
derivated or something that is no more than an adornment, a kind of 
luxury amidst the practical life"10 - and something tacitly closed 
within the bounds of individual consciousness. 
Mukarovsky will outcome Ingarden's „isolationist" position by 
having postulated an artwork as a specific autonomous sign, that con-
tinues to be related to the extra-aesthetic reality: the point at issue is 
just the nature of the relation to the reality as a whole. Contrary to 
Ingarden, for whom just the freedom from representing reality in a 
work of art allows for a full autonomization of its aesthetic compo-
nent, or aesthetically valuable qualities, Mukarovsky will see the aes-
thetic function of an artwork and the latter's value to „have been built" 
with extra-aesthetic functions and values. Art's meaning in the human 
life is derived by Mukarovsky precisely from the fact that art, „driven 
by the aesthetic function, tends to an ever richer multifunctionality"1 \ 
i.e., art „feeds" the plenitude of the human attitude toward the world 
and „reveals, ever anew, the principal multifunctionality of the rela-
tionship between the man and the reality, thereby also displaying an 
inexhaustible well of possibilities the reality offers for human action, 
perception, and cognition"12. For all that, for Mukarovsky, an art-
work's relation to the reality is till that of a sort of opposition, if I may 
call it so: after all, it is the reality's image-sign, whose main objective 
should be to communicate a certain view of the reality (i.e., ideational 
content) in the direction from the author to the recipient. 
It is Dewey that has „abolished" his kind of relationship, obtaining 
between an artwork and the reality, and that is not unfolding his aes-
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thetic arguments against the backdrop of this opposition. For him, a 
work of art is no sign to convey the author's construal of the reality, it 
is an expression of experience itself. So therefore, in this conception, 
art, above all, appears not as an product-artwork, but as a process, as a 
quality of a processual character of human experience, or as aesthetic 
experience. The salience of aesthetic experience that renders the latter 
ever so essential for people consists in that it is an integral, indivisible 
experience (as distinct from other, more specialized, kinds of human 
experience) and just in virtue of that, Dewey insists, aesthetic experi-
ence is the realization, or articulation, of genuine experience. Dewey 
would contend that experience has more than one goal, none of which 
being pre-given. The fact, according to him, will secure that art be in 
the service of life as such, in the service of „the very process of a joy-1 ^  
ful acquisition of experience" . That definition of the art's meaning is 
reminiscent of Mukarovsky's construal of the art's aesthetic function-
ality, with the difference though that Dewey would not be singling out 
art into a separate semiotic realm, above all, designed to communicate 
mental contents - for him, art is an integral component of human ex-
perience, a component of „pragmatic" relationship, to which serves 
also communication, viz., the relationship between the man and the 
surroundings. 
By way of upshot, a few typological suggestions might be in place. 
In Ingarden, the status of an artwork is essentially substantiated by 
individual consciousness; in Mukarovsky, it is the interface of the 
artwork's material component and consciousness (any element of the 
artwork's semiotic structure performs as a vehicle of meaning), the 
central place being occupied by the meaningful structure, i.e., by the 
fact of collective consciousness. Dewey, in turn, will substantiate the 
ontological status of an artwork, proceeding from the human action 
(experience), of which consciousness (undivided vertically and inves-
tigated by Dewey horizontally) is but an inner component. The modi-
fications Dewey have accomplished in the starting points of his rea-
soning suggest that art, or an artwork, is no longer primarily con-
ceived of as fact of consciousness and the latter's relation to the real-
ity, it is a fact of human beingness, a certain way of human beingness. 
Art is a „direct" invigoration of human experience, it is a „pushing" of 
the potentialities hidden in any experience to their full manifestation, 
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amplification, and enrichment. Dewey would object to „promote" art 
from being just a constituent of immediate human life to the realm of 
„fine arts"; similarly, he would condemn the practice of a picture-
gallery mediated art as such that is based on the mistaken strategy of 
extracting art from the context of human experience. As it is widely 
known, Dewey has moved reasoning on art's forms of beingness from 
the level of consciousness (Ingarden), or from the level of conscious-
ness/beingness relation ( Mukarovsky), to that of human beingness, 
consciousness constituting its component. 
Under the foregoing interpretation, thus, Roman Ingarden, Jan Mu-
karovsky and John Dewey appear as proponents of the three plausible 
solutions of the ontological status of an artwork, which I sought to 
show, this time drawing on extracts from the coherent body of the 
respective theories. 
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